Additional Details for "A Closer Look at Civic Honesty in Collectivist Cultures"[1]

1 The relationship between collectivism and wallet recovery arises due to perfect multicollinearity

Table S1 documents the multicollinearity problem present in YAC's regression results of city-level collectivism on wallet recovery rates. Model 1 in the table reproduces YAC's finding that their measure of collectivism at the city-level — namely, the percentage of cultivated land devoted to rice paddies in each province in 1996 — predicts wallet recovery rates (Table 2, model 6 in YAC; *1*). Note that the model also includes a set of indicators for cities in which the wallet drop-offs were performed (i.e., city fixed effects). Since there is a perfect correspondence between the two, including both collectivism and city fixed effects in the model leads to "double dipping" on the same information.

To illustrate this problem, models 2–10 in Table S1 use the same regression specification as model 1 but vary which city is designated as the reference category. Changing the reference city should have zero impact on the other predictors in the model, and indeed, this is the case for all covariates other than the collectivism coefficient. Also note that changing the reference category has no effect on overall model fit (e.g., R^2), indicating that no new information has been added or removed from the model. However, because collectivism is perfectly collinear with cities, changing the reference category for city fixed effects means that different city indicators will not be estimable and instead are "absorbed" by the collectivism coefficient. Indeed, even though no new information is being introduced to the model, the coefficient for collectivism in models 2-10 swings wildly from significantly positive (as reported by YAC in model 1) to significantly negative (model 3) to anything in between. Such large swings due to arbitrary model changes indicate that the coefficient for collectivism is not meaningful in the presence of multicollinearity.

To further see the point, model 11 in Table S1 uses the same regression specification and statistical software program as YAC, but simply changes the order in which variables are entered into the right-hand side of the equation — placing city fixed effects before rather than after collectivism. Because the information contained in the collectivism predictor is already captured by city fixed effects, statistical software programs like Stata and R drop the collectivism coefficient (i.e., is no longer estimable).

Lastly, model 12 reports the results after removing city fixed effects from the model. Doing so preserves all other aspects of YAC's regression specification while eliminating multicollinearity. This small change reduces the collectivism coefficient from 0.456 to 0.097, and is no longer statistically significant at $P < 0.05$. We also note that by removing city fixed effects, but not accounting for the clustered nature of the data at the city-level, tends to bias standard errors downward and increases the likelihood of observing a significant result (i.e., our approach is conservatively tilted in favor of confirming YAC's original result). When we instead implement a wild bootstrap clustered by cities, which accounts for the small number of clusters in the data (*2*), confidence intervals widen and all *P*-values increase in size.

[1] Code for all analyses can be found at `https://researchbox.org/1844`.

Table S2 reproduces the multicollinearity analysis using YAC's alternative measure of collectivism, which uses a 16-item self-report scale with responses averaged at the city level. We again find that the collectivism coefficient swings wildly when arbitrarily changing the reference category for city fixed effects. Once multicollinearity is corrected by removing city fixed effects, the collectivism coefficient is no longer statistically significant and the coefficient sign reverses. Tables S3 and S4 reproduce the analysis using total wallet recovery (i.e., whether a wallet was successfully recovered and not missing any items) as the outcome variable and return similar results.

To examine whether the null results we observe for collectivism are specific to our particular regression model, we conducted 4,400 model combinations. We considered the regression specification used by YAC to be the "complete" or saturated model and a regression that only contains collectivism as a predictor to be the minimal or "bare" model, and examined every possible combination in between those two extremes. This returns 550 possible combinations of inclusion or exclusion of the treatment, covariates (Male, Age ≥ 40, Computer, Coworkers, Other bystanders), institution fixed effects, and all treatment-covariate interactions.[2] We repeated this process using both ordinary least squares and logit regression, and separately for both measures of collectivism (i.e., percentage of rice paddies and collectivism index scores) and both measures of safekeeping (wallet recovery and total wallet recovery). Not a single regression model returned a statistically significant result for collectivism at $P < 0.05$.

In sum, YAC's replication data fails to provide support for the hypothesis that collectivism is expressed by wallet safekeeping. The results reported in YAC are due to an error in their regression specifications; once the error is corrected, the relationship between collectivism and wallet safekeeping disappears.

2 Responses to civic honesty questions in YAC's field experiment are compromised

As mentioned by YAC, the civic honesty questions in their field experiment were asked only after research assistants revealed their identity and the purpose of the study, which likely introduces demand effects (*3*). Additionally, and not discussed by YAC, is the fact that 25-30% of recipients in the field study did not respond to the civic honesty questions, and participants were significantly less likely to respond to these questions if they did not email the owner, money was missing, items other than money were missing, or the wallet was not successfully recovered (all Ps < 0.001 when conducting a series of two sample proportion tests). Thus, responses to these survey items are likely biased by who chose to respond, and those who chose to respond behaved systematically differently from those who did not. These selection bias issues and potential demand effects might explain why the responses are dramatically different between participants from the field experiment and respondents from the nationally representative survey — only 39% of the participants in the experiment stated that failing to contact the owner of a lost wallet was dishonest, compared to 62% of respondents in the nationally representative survey.

[2]For the inclusion of interaction terms, we restricted the set of combinations to those that also included both lower-order terms (e.g., the Money $\times$ Male interaction term could be included in a model only if both Money and Male were also included in the model). This results in a total of $2^7 + \binom{5}{1}2^5 + \binom{5}{2}2^4 + \binom{5}{3}2^3 + \binom{5}{4}2^2 + 2^1 = 550$ combinations.

3 Is emailing more diagnostic than safekeeping of (evidently) honest behavior?

YAC claim that safekeeping is a more valid measure than emailing of civic honesty in China. Examining their behavioral data, we compare those who emailed versus those who did not email but did return the wallet (i.e., "emailers" versus "safekeepers"). Among wallets that contained money and were successfully recovered, money was more than twice as likely to be missing when the recipient did not email the owner (13%) than when they did (5%), $z = 1.82$, $P = 0.07$. More generally, emailing is more likely to lead to a total wallet recovery (88%) than when recipients do not email (64%), $z = 5.14$, $P < 0.001$. This suggests that emailing may be a more diagnostic indicator of (evidently) honest behavior than mere safekeeping.

4 Simulating total wallet recovery under the null

While YAC replicate our main result that email reporting rates are higher for wallets with money than without, they also find the opposite result when examining wallets returned with missing items (i.e., total wallet recovery). This outcome takes a value of 100 if all wallet contents are recovered, and 0 otherwise (including when the wallet was not successfully recovered).

The difference in total wallet recovery rates across conditions is driven by the fact that money is sometimes missing from wallets with money. For instance, when restricting total wallet recovery to only non-monetary items, there was no statistically distinguishable difference in recovery rates between wallets with and without money (28% vs. 25%), $z = 0.71$, $P = 0.476$. The problem is that, by design, wallets without money can never have money missing. Even if recipients would have pocketed money in the no-money condition, this cannot be observed and, as such, leads to censored data in only one condition. This censoring issue mechanically biases YAC's results towards a negative treatment effect (i.e., a lower total wallet recovery rate in the money condition).

To demonstrate this issue, we performed Monte Carlo simulations that match the design and empirical properties found in YAC and examine results under the null (i.e., no difference in total wallet recovery across conditions). Examining results under the null allows us to quantify the degree of bias inherent to YAC's study design.

The steps of our simulation, which follow the design and coding of outcomes found in YAC, are as follows:

1. We start with a sample of 496 recipients.
2. Recipients are randomly assigned to one of two treatment conditions (0 = no money, 1 = money).
3. In YAC, the probability of failing to recover a wallet was 0.2218. We generate a "wallet missing" variable in which recipients from both conditions draw from binomial distribution $B(1, 0.2218)$.
4. In YAC, the probability of missing an item other than money, conditional on a wallet being recovered, was 0.0544 across conditions. We generate a "missing nonmoney" variable in which recipients in both conditions draw from binomial distribution $B(1, 0.0544)$.

5. In YAC, the probability of missing money, conditional on a wallet with money being recovered, was 0.0974. We generate a "missing money" variable in which recipients in both conditions draw from binomial distribution $B(1, 0.0974)$. Note that in YAC we only observe this behavior in the money treatment, but under the null we draw from the same distribution for both conditions.
6. To mirror the design in YAC, we then censor all "missing money" scores in the no-money treatment by assigning them a value of 0.
7. We construct a "total wallet recovery" score as in YAC, which takes a value of 100 if values to all three variables (wallet missing, missing nonmoney, missing money) are equal to 0, and 0 otherwise.
8. We then regress total wallet recovery onto treatment assignment, using robust standard errors. We record the coefficient sign and significance level.
9. Steps 1-8 are repeated 10,000 times.

If the design of YAC is unbiased, under the null we should expect a negative treatment effect in approximately 50% of cases, and a false positive rate of 5% (i.e., a *P*-value less than .05).[3] Instead, the simulation returns a negative treatment effect in 96% of simulation runs, and a false positive rate of 41%. Thus, the data censoring issue in YAC leads to an 8-fold increase in the nominal false positive rate and heavily biases the results towards finding a negative treatment effect.

References

1. Q. Yang, et al., Unraveling controversies over civic honesty measurement: An extended field replication in China. *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.* **120**, e2213824120 (2023).
2. I. A. Canay, A. Santos, A. M. Shaikh, The wild bootstrap with a "small" number of "large" clusters. *Rev. Econ. Stat.* **103**, 346–363 (2021).
3. S. J. Weber & T. D. Cook, Subject effects in laboratory research: An examination of subject roles, demand characteristics, and valid inference. *Psych. Bull.* **77**, 273–295 (1972).

[3] Indeed, eliminating the data censoring problem in our simulations (i.e., removing step 6 and re-running the simulation) returns a negative treatment effect in 49.97% of cases, and a false positive rate of 5.33%.

Table S1: Wallet Recovery and Collectivism (% of Rice Paddies)

	YAC's specification	Arbitrary changes to YAC's specification										Corrected specification
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Reference city	Beijing	Guangzhou	Shanghai	Tianjin	Nanjing	Chengdu	Xi'an	Harbin	Hangzhou	Shenzhen	Beijing	—
Money	2.046	2.046	2.046	2.046	2.046	2.046	2.046	2.046	2.046	2.046	2.046	2.189
	(3.812)	(3.812)	(3.812)	(3.812)	(3.812)	(3.812)	(3.812)	(3.812)	(3.812)	(3.812)	(3.812)	(3.924)
Male	−3.934	−3.934	−3.934	−3.934	−3.934	−3.934	−3.934	−3.934	−3.934	−3.934	−3.934	−4.358
	(6.033)	(6.033)	(6.033)	(6.033)	(6.033)	(6.033)	(6.033)	(6.033)	(6.033)	(6.033)	(6.033)	(6.154)
Age $\geq$ 40	−1.736	−1.736	−1.736	−1.736	−1.736	−1.736	−1.736	−1.736	−1.736	−1.736	−1.736	−1.806
	(7.169)	(7.169)	(7.169)	(7.169)	(7.169)	(7.169)	(7.169)	(7.169)	(7.169)	(7.169)	(7.169)	(7.396)
Computer	9.237	9.237	9.237	9.237	9.237	9.237	9.237	9.237	9.237	9.237	9.237	6.701
	(7.270)	(7.270)	(7.270)	(7.270)	(7.270)	(7.270)	(7.270)	(7.270)	(7.270)	(7.270)	(7.270)	(7.334)
Coworkers	−3.016	−3.016	−3.016	−3.016	−3.016	−3.016	−3.016	−3.016	−3.016	−3.016	−3.016	−4.433
	(6.490)	(6.490)	(6.490)	(6.490)	(6.490)	(6.490)	(6.490)	(6.490)	(6.490)	(6.490)	(6.490)	(6.613)
Other bystanders	−8.315	−8.315	−8.315	−8.315	−8.315	−8.315	−8.315	−8.315	−8.315	−8.315	−8.315	−9.298
	(6.167)	(6.167)	(6.167)	(6.167)	(6.167)	(6.167)	(6.167)	(6.167)	(6.167)	(6.167)	(6.167)	(5.825)
% of rice paddies	0.456***	0.284	−1.989***	0.253*	0.718	−0.199	0.199	0.225	−0.578	−0.578	(dropped)	0.097
	(0.116)	(0.837)	(0.521)	(0.119)	(1.238)	(0.246)	(0.119)	(0.123)	(0.752)	(0.752)		(0.062)
Controls:												
City FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Institution FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	434	434	434	434	434	434	434	434	434	434	434	434
R^2	0.105	0.105	0.105	0.105	0.105	0.105	0.105	0.105	0.105	0.105	0.105	0.034
Adjusted R^2	0.052	0.052	0.052	0.052	0.052	0.052	0.052	0.052	0.052	0.052	0.052	−0.003

Notes: OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable takes a value 100 if a wallet was successfully recovered and 0 otherwise. All models include an indicator for treatment condition ("Money"), a set of binary controls ("Male", "Age $\geq$ 40", "Computer", "Coworkers", "Other bystanders"), institution fixed effects, city fixed effects, and a set of demeaned treatment-covariate interactions (see YAC for full details). "% of rice paddies" represents the percentage of cultivated land devoted to rice paddies in each province in 1996, which is used as a proxy for collectivism. "Reference city" indicates which city is designated as the reference category when including city fixed effects. Model 1 represents the original specification found in YAC (Table 2, model 6). Models 2-10 permute which city is designated as the reference category for city fixed effects, which introduces no new information (i.e., does not change the model R^2) and for a properly specified model should not affect other predictors (including % of rice paddies). Model 11 is identical to model 1, except that city fixed effects are entered into the regression before % of rice paddies; because the latter is perfectly collinear with the former, it is not estimable and dropped from the model. Finally, model 12 presents coefficients when city fixed effects are excluded from the model. $^{*}P < 0.05$, $^{**}P < 0.01$, $^{***}P < 0.001$.

Table S2: Wallet Recovery and Collectivism (Self-Reported City Collectivism Index)

	YAC's specification	Arbitrary changes to YAC's specification										Corrected specification
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Reference city	Beijing	Guangzhou	Shanghai	Tianjin	Nanjing	Chengdu	Xi'an	Harbin	Hangzhou	Shenzhen	Beijing	—
Money	−10.282*	−10.282*	−10.282*	−10.282*	−10.282*	−10.282*	−10.282*	−10.282*	−10.282*	−10.282*	−10.282*	−10.232*
	(4.259)	(4.259)	(4.259)	(4.259)	(4.259)	(4.259)	(4.259)	(4.259)	(4.259)	(4.259)	(4.259)	(4.349)
Male	−2.509	−2.509	−2.509	−2.509	−2.509	−2.509	−2.509	−2.509	−2.509	−2.509	−2.509	−1.652
	(6.286)	(6.286)	(6.286)	(6.286)	(6.286)	(6.286)	(6.286)	(6.286)	(6.286)	(6.286)	(6.286)	(6.264)
Age $\geq$ 40	1.723	1.723	1.723	1.723	1.723	1.723	1.723	1.723	1.723	1.723	1.723	1.767
	(7.209)	(7.209)	(7.209)	(7.209)	(7.209)	(7.209)	(7.209)	(7.209)	(7.209)	(7.209)	(7.209)	(7.325)
Computer	10.905	10.905	10.905	10.905	10.905	10.905	10.905	10.905	10.905	10.905	10.905	8.994
	(7.379)	(7.379)	(7.379)	(7.379)	(7.379)	(7.379)	(7.379)	(7.379)	(7.379)	(7.379)	(7.379)	(7.509)
Coworkers	−3.651	−3.651	−3.651	−3.651	−3.651	−3.651	−3.651	−3.651	−3.651	−3.651	−3.651	−2.970
	(7.021)	(7.021)	(7.021)	(7.021)	(7.021)	(7.021)	(7.021)	(7.021)	(7.021)	(7.021)	(7.021)	(7.053)
Other bystanders	−10.444	−10.444	−10.444	−10.444	−10.444	−10.444	−10.444	−10.444	−10.444	−10.444	−10.444	−10.618
	(6.199)	(6.199)	(6.199)	(6.199)	(6.199)	(6.199)	(6.199)	(6.199)	(6.199)	(6.199)	(6.199)	(5.810)
% of rice paddies	0.389**	0.383	−1.810**	0.094	0.177	−0.195	0.039	0.046	−1.264	−1.264	(dropped)	−0.054
	(0.133)	(1.042)	(0.604)	(0.135)	(1.320)	(0.372)	(0.134)	(0.136)	(0.999)	(0.999)		(0.066)
Controls:												
City FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Institution FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	434	434	434	434	434	434	434	434	434	434	434	434
R^2	0.100	0.100	0.100	0.100	0.100	0.100	0.100	0.100	0.100	0.100	0.100	0.046
Adjusted R^2	0.047	0.047	0.047	0.047	0.047	0.047	0.047	0.047	0.047	0.047	0.047	0.009

Notes: OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable takes a value 100 if a wallet was successfully recovered and 0 otherwise. All models include an indicator for treatment condition ("Money"), a set of binary controls ("Male", "Age $\geq$ 40", "Computer", "Coworkers", "Other bystanders"), institution fixed effects, city fixed effects, and a set of demeaned treatment-covariate interactions (see YAC for full details). "Collectivism index" represents the city-average response to a 16-item self report scale of collectivism (see YAC for full details). "Reference city" indicates which city is designated as the reference category when including city fixed effects. Model 1 represents the original specification found in YAC (Table S5, model 2). Models 2-10 permute which city is designated as the reference category for city fixed effects, which introduces no new information (i.e., does not change the model R^2) and for a properly specified model should not affect other predictors (including % of rice paddies). Model 11 is identical to model 1, except that city fixed effects are entered into the regression before % of rice paddies; because the latter is perfectly collinear with the former, it is not estimable and dropped from the model. Finally, model 12 presents coefficients when city fixed effects are excluded from the model. $^{*}P < 0.05$, $^{**}P < 0.01$, $^{***}P < 0.001$.

Table S3: Total Wallet Recovery and Collectivism (% of Rice Paddies)

	YAC's specification	Arbitrary changes to YAC's specification										Corrected specification
Reference city	(1) Beijing	(2) Guangzhou	(3) Shanghai	(4) Tianjin	(5) Nanjing	(6) Chengdu	(7) Xi'an	(8) Harbin	(9) Hangzhou	(10) Shenzhen	(11) Beijing	(12) —
Money	2.046	2.046	2.046	2.046	2.046	2.046	2.046	2.046	2.046	2.046	2.046	2.136
	(3.812)	(3.812)	(3.812)	(3.812)	(3.812)	(3.812)	(3.812)	(3.812)	(3.812)	(3.812)	(3.812)	(3.937)
Male	−3.934	−3.934	−3.934	−3.934	−3.934	−3.934	−3.934	−3.934	−3.934	−3.934	−3.934	−3.086
	(6.033)	(6.033)	(6.033)	(6.033)	(6.033)	(6.033)	(6.033)	(6.033)	(6.033)	(6.033)	(6.033)	(6.068)
Age $\geq$ 40	−1.736	−1.736	−1.736	−1.736	−1.736	−1.736	−1.736	−1.736	−1.736	−1.736	−1.736	−0.954
	(7.169)	(7.169)	(7.169)	(7.169)	(7.169)	(7.169)	(7.169)	(7.169)	(7.169)	(7.169)	(7.169)	(7.325)
Computer	9.237	9.237	9.237	9.237	9.237	9.237	9.237	9.237	9.237	9.237	9.237	7.772
	(7.270)	(7.270)	(7.270)	(7.270)	(7.270)	(7.270)	(7.270)	(7.270)	(7.270)	(7.270)	(7.270)	(7.385)
Coworkers	−3.016	−3.016	−3.016	−3.016	−3.016	−3.016	−3.016	−3.016	−3.016	−3.016	−3.016	−3.246
	(6.490)	(6.490)	(6.490)	(6.490)	(6.490)	(6.490)	(6.490)	(6.490)	(6.490)	(6.490)	(6.490)	(6.659)
Other bystanders	−8.315	−8.315	−8.315	−8.315	−8.315	−8.315	−8.315	−8.315	−8.315	−8.315	−8.315	−8.631
	(6.167)	(6.167)	(6.167)	(6.167)	(6.167)	(6.167)	(6.167)	(6.167)	(6.167)	(6.167)	(6.167)	(5.715)
Collectivism index	438.576***	47.037	2832.303***	87.026*	136.323	−17.805	59.018	−204.372	−31.517	−31.517	(dropped)	−15.141
	(111.995)	(38.082)	(741.751)	(41.028)	(235.091)	(21.973)	(35.244)	(111.594)	(41.052)	(41.052)		(14.403)
Controls:												
City FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Institution FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	434	434	434	434	434	434	434	434	434	434	434	434
R^2	0.105	0.105	0.105	0.105	0.105	0.105	0.105	0.105	0.105	0.105	0.105	0.030
Adjusted R^2	0.052	0.052	0.052	0.052	0.052	0.052	0.052	0.052	0.052	0.052	0.052	−0.007

Notes: OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable takes a value 100 if a wallet was successfully recovered without missing any items and 0 otherwise. All models include an indicator for treatment condition ("Money"), a set of binary controls ("Male", "Age $\geq$ 40", "Computer", "Coworkers", "Other bystanders"), institution fixed effects, city fixed effects, and a set of demeaned treatment-covariate interactions (see YAC for full details). "% of rice paddies" represents the percentage of cultivated land devoted to rice paddies in each province in 1996, which is used as a proxy for collectivism. "Reference city" indicates which city is designated as the reference category when including city fixed effects. Model 1 represents the original specification found in YAC (Table 2, model 9). Models 2-10 permute which city is designated as the reference category for city fixed effects, which introduces no new information (i.e., does not change the model R^2) and for a properly specified model should not affect other predictors (including % of rice paddies). Model 11 is identical to model 1, except that city fixed effects are entered into the regression before % of rice paddies; because the latter is perfectly collinear with the former, it is not estimable and dropped from the model. Finally, model 12 presents coefficients when city fixed effects are excluded from the model. $^{*}P < 0.05$, $^{**}P < 0.01$, $^{***}P < 0.001$.

Table S4: Total Wallet Recovery and Collectivism (Self-Reported City Collectivism Index)

	YAC's specification	Arbitrary changes to YAC's specification										Corrected specification
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Reference city	Beijing	Guangzhou	Shanghai	Tianjin	Nanjing	Chengdu	Xi'an	Harbin	Hangzhou	Shenzhen	Beijing	—
Money	−10.282*	−10.282*	−10.282*	−10.282*	−10.282*	−10.282*	−10.282*	−10.282*	−10.282*	−10.282*	−10.282*	−10.210*
	(4.259)	(4.259)	(4.259)	(4.259)	(4.259)	(4.259)	(4.259)	(4.259)	(4.259)	(4.259)	(4.259)	(4.345)
Male	−2.509	−2.509	−2.509	−2.509	−2.509	−2.509	−2.509	−2.509	−2.509	−2.509	−2.509	−2.551
	(6.286)	(6.286)	(6.286)	(6.286)	(6.286)	(6.286)	(6.286)	(6.286)	(6.286)	(6.286)	(6.286)	(6.211)
Age $\geq$ 40	1.723	1.723	1.723	1.723	1.723	1.723	1.723	1.723	1.723	1.723	1.723	1.519
	(7.209)	(7.209)	(7.209)	(7.209)	(7.209)	(7.209)	(7.209)	(7.209)	(7.209)	(7.209)	(7.209)	(7.352)
Computer	10.905	10.905	10.905	10.905	10.905	10.905	10.905	10.905	10.905	10.905	10.905	7.893
	(7.379)	(7.379)	(7.379)	(7.379)	(7.379)	(7.379)	(7.379)	(7.379)	(7.379)	(7.379)	(7.379)	(7.572)
Coworkers	−3.651	−3.651	−3.651	−3.651	−3.651	−3.651	−3.651	−3.651	−3.651	−3.651	−3.651	−2.233
	(7.021)	(7.021)	(7.021)	(7.021)	(7.021)	(7.021)	(7.021)	(7.021)	(7.021)	(7.021)	(7.021)	(7.050)
Other bystanders	−10.444	−10.444	−10.444	−10.444	−10.444	−10.444	−10.444	−10.444	−10.444	−10.444	−10.444	−10.985
	(6.199)	(6.199)	(6.199)	(6.199)	(6.199)	(6.199)	(6.199)	(6.199)	(6.199)	(6.199)	(6.199)	(5.781)
Collectivism index	374.078**	89.852	2577.557**	32.200	33.524	−17.404	11.507	−41.815	−68.977	−68.977	(dropped)	−21.690
	(128.257)	(49.040)	(860.177)	(46.613)	(250.523)	(33.251)	(39.598)	(124.030)	(54.508)	(54.508)		(16.548)
Controls:												
City FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Institution FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	434	434	434	434	434	434	434	434	434	434	434	434
R^2	0.100	0.100	0.100	0.100	0.100	0.100	0.100	0.100	0.100	0.100	0.100	0.048
Adjusted R^2	0.047	0.047	0.047	0.047	0.047	0.047	0.047	0.047	0.047	0.047	0.047	0.011

Notes: OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable takes a value 100 if a wallet was successfully recovered without missing any items and 0 otherwise. All models include an indicator for treatment condition ("Money"), a set of binary controls ("Male", "Age $\geq$ 40", "Computer", "Coworkers", "Other bystanders"), institution fixed effects, city fixed effects, and a set of demeaned treatment-covariate interactions (see YAC for full details). "Collectivism index" represents the city-average response to a 16-item self report scale of collectivism (see YAC for full details). "Reference city" indicates which city is designated as the reference category when including city fixed effects. Model 1 represents the original specification found in YAC (Table S5, model 3). Models 2-10 permute which city is designated as the reference category for city fixed effects, which introduces no new information (i.e., does not change the model R^2) and for a properly specified model should not affect other predictors (including % of rice paddies). Model 11 is identical to model 1, except that city fixed effects are entered into the regression before % of rice paddies; because the latter is perfectly collinear with the former, it is not estimable and dropped from the model. Finally, model 12 presents coefficients when city fixed effects are excluded from the model. $^{*}P < 0.05$, $^{**}P < 0.01$, $^{***}P < 0.001$.